In this paper, we study fault-tolerant distributed consensus in wireless systems. In more detail, we produce two new randomized algorithms that solve this problem in the abstract MAC layer model, which captures the basic interface and communication guarantees provided by most wireless MAC layers. Our algorithms work for any number of failures, require no advance knowledge of the network participants or network size, and guarantee termination with high probability after a number of broadcasts that are polynomial in the network size. Our first algorithm satisfies the standard agreement property, while our second trades a faster termination guarantee in exchange for a looser agreement property in which most nodes agree on the same value. These are the first known fault-tolerant consensus algorithms for this model. In addition to our main upper bound results, we explore the gap between the abstract MAC layer and the standard asynchronous message passing model by proving fault-tolerant consensus is impossible in the latter in the absence of information regarding the network participants, even if we assume no faults, allow randomized solutions, and provide the algorithm a constant-factor approximation of the network size.
Introduction
Consensus provides a fundamental building block for developing reliable distributed systems [23] [24] [25] . Accordingly, it is well studied in many different system models [36] . Until recently, however, little was known about solving this problem in distributed systems made up of devices communicating using commodity wireless cards. Motivated by this knowledge gap, this paper studies consensus in the abstract MAC layer model, which abstracts the basic behavior and guarantees of standard wireless MAC layers. In recent work [43] , we proved deterministic fault-tolerant consensus is impossible in this setting. In this paper, we describe and analyze the first known randomized fault-tolerant consensus algorithms for this well-motivated model.
The Abstract MAC Layer. Most existing work on distributed algorithms for wireless networks assumes low-level synchronous models that force algorithms to directly grapple with issues caused by contention and signal fading. Some of these models describe the network topology with a graph (c.f., [8, 16, 20, 28, 32, 39] ), while others use signal strength calculations to determine message behavior (c.f., [17, 21, 26, 27, 38, 40] ).
rithms, for example, is to repeatedly collect messages from at least n − f nodes in a network of size n with at most f crash failures (e.g., [9] ). This strategy does not work in the abstract MAC layer model as nodes do not know n.
To overcome this issue, we adapt an idea introduced in early work on fault-tolerant consensus in the asynchronous shared memory model: counter racing (e.g., [5, 12] ). At a high-level, this strategy has nodes with initial value 0 advance a shared memory counter associated with 0, while nodes with initial value 1 advance a counter associated with 1. If a node sees one counter get ahead of the other, they adopt the initial value associated with the larger counter, and if a counter gets sufficiently far ahead, then nodes can decide.
Our first algorithm (presented in Section 3) implements a counter race of sorts using the acknowledged blind broadcast primitive provided by the model. Roughly speaking, nodes continually broadcast their current proposal and counter, and update both based on the pairs received from other nodes. Proving safety for this type of strategy in shared memory models is simplified by the atomic nature of register accesses. In the abstract MAC layer model, by contrast, a broadcast message is delivered non-atomically to its recipients, and in the case of a crash, may not arrive at some recipients at all. 1 Our safety analysis, therefore, requires novel analytical tools that tame a more diverse set of possible system configurations.
To achieve liveness, we use a technique loosely inspired by the randomized delay strategy introduced by Chandra in the shared memory model [12] . In more detail, nodes probabilistically decide to replace certain sequences of their counter updates with nop placeholders. We show that if these probabilities are adapted appropriately, the system eventually arrives at a state where it becomes likely for only a single node to be broadcasting updates, allowing progress toward termination.
Formally, we prove that with high probability in the network size n, the algorithm terminates after O(n 3 log n) broadcasts are scheduled. This holds regardless of which broadcasts are scheduled (i.e., we do not impose a fairness condition), and regardless of the number of faults. The algorithm, as described, assumes nodes are provided unique IDs that we treat as comparable black boxes (to prevent them from leaking network size information). We subsequently show how to remove that assumption by describing an algorithm that generates unique IDs in this setting with high probability.
Our second algorithm (presented in Section 4) trades a looser agreement guarantee for more efficiency. In more detail, we describe and analyze a solution to almost-everywhere agreement [18] , that guarantees most nodes agree on the same value. This algorithm terminates after O(n 2 log 4 n log log n) broadcasts, which is a linear factor faster than our first algorithm (ignoring log factors). The almosteverywhere consensus algorithm consists of two phases. The first phase is used to ensure that almost all nodes obtain a good approximation of the network size. In the second phase, nodes use this estimate to perform a sequence of broadcasts meant to help spread their proposal to the network. Nodes that did not obtain a good estimate in Phase 1 will leave Phase 2 early. The remaining nodes, however, can leverage their accurate network size estimates to probabilistically sample a subset to actively participate in each round of broadcasts. To break ties between simultaneously active nodes, each chooses a random rank using the estimate obtained in Phase 1. We show that with high probability, after not too long, there exists a round of broadcasts in which the first node receiving its acknowledgment is both active and has the minimum rank among other active model in which consensus is solvable without this network information.
We also consider almost-everywhere (a.e.) agreement [18] , a weaker variant of consensus, where a small number of nodes are allowed to decide on conflicting values, as long as a sufficiently large majority agrees. Recently, a.e. agreement has been studied in the context of peer-to-peer networks (c.f. [7, 31] ), where the adversary can isolate small parts of the network thus rendering (everywhere) consensus impossible. We are not aware of any prior work on a.e. agreement in the wireless settings.
Model and Problem
In this paper, we study a variation of the abstract MAC layer model, which describes system consisting of a single hop network of n ≥ 1 computational devices (called nodes in the following) that communicate wirelessly using communication interfaces and guarantees inspired by commodity wireless MAC layers.
In this model, nodes communicate with a bcast primitive that guarantees to eventually deliver the broadcast message to all the other nodes (i.e., the network is single hop). At some point after a given bcast has succeeded in delivering a message to all other nodes, the broadcaster receives an ack informing it that the broadcast is complete (as detailed in the introduction, this captures the reality that most wireless contention management schemes have a definitive point at which they know a message broadcast is complete). This acknowledgment contains no information about the number or identity of the receivers.
We assume a node can only broadcast one message at a time. That is, once it invokes bcast, it cannot broadcast another message until receiving the corresponding ack (formally, overlapping messages are discarded by the MAC layer). We also assume any number of nodes can permanently stop executing due to crash failures. As in the classical message passing models, a crash can occur during a broadcast, meaning that some nodes might receive the message while others do not.
This model is event-driven with the relevant events scheduled asynchronously by an arbitrary scheduler. In more detail, for each node u, there are four event types relevant to u that can be scheduled: init u (which occurs at the beginning of an execution and allows u to initialize), recv(m) u (which indicates that u has received message m broadcast from another node), ack(m) u (which indicates that the message m broadcast by u has been successfully delivered), and crash u (which indicates that u is crashed for the remainder of the execution).
A distributed algorithm specifies for each node u a finite collection of steps to execute for each of the non-crash event types. When one of these events is scheduled by the scheduler, we assume the corresponding steps are executed atomically at the point that the event is scheduled. Notice that one of the steps that a node u can take in response to these events is to invoke a bcast(m) u primitive for some message m. When an event includes a bcast primitive we say it is combined with a broadcast. 3 We place the following constraints on the scheduler. It must start each execution by scheduling an init event for each node; i.e., we study the setting where all participating nodes are activated at the beginning of the execution. If a node u invokes a valid bcast(m) u primitive, then for each v = u that is not crashed when the broadcast primitive is invoked, the scheduler must subsequently either schedule a single recv(m) v or crash v event at v. At some point after these events are scheduled, it must then eventually schedule an ack(m) u event at u. These are the only recv and ack events it schedules (i.e., it cannot create new messages from scratch or cause messages to be received/acknowledged multiple times). If the scheduler schedules a crash v event, it cannot subsequently schedule any future events for u.
We assume that in making each event scheduling decision, the scheduler can use the schedule history as well as the algorithm definition, but it does not know the nodes' private states (which includes the nodes' random bits). When the scheduler schedules an event that triggers a broadcast (making it a combined event), it is provided this information so that it knows it must now schedule receive events for the message. We assume, however, that the scheduler does not learn the contents of the broadcast message. 4 Given an execution α, we say the message schedule for α, also indicated msg [α] , is the sequence of message events (i.e., recv, ack, and crash) scheduled in the execution. We assume that a message schedule includes indications of which events are combined with broadcasts.
The Consensus Problem. In this paper, we study binary consensus with probabilistic termination. In more detail, at the beginning of an execution each node is provided an initial value from {0, 1} as input. Each node has the ability to perform a single irrevocable decide action for either value 0 or 1. To solve consensus, an algorithm must guarantee the following three properties: (1) agreement: no two nodes decide different values; (2) validity: if a node decides value b, then at least one node started with initial value b; and (3) termination (probabilistic): every non-crashed node decides with probability 1 in the limit.
Studying finite termination bounds is complicated in asynchronous models because the scheduler can delay specific nodes taking steps for arbitrarily long times. In this paper, we circumvent this issue by proving bounds on the number of scheduled events before the system reaches a termination state in which every non-crashed node has: (a) decided; or (b) will decide whenever the scheduler gets around to scheduling its next ack event.
Finally, in addition to studying consensus with standard agreement, we also study almosteverywhere agreement, in which only a specified majority fraction (typically a 1 − o(n) fraction of the n total nodes) must agree.
Consensus Algorithm
Here we describe analyze our randomized binary consensus algorithm: counter race consensus (see Algorithms 1 and 2 for pseudocode, and Section 3.1 for a high-level description of its behavior). This algorithm assumes no advance knowledge of the network participants or network size. Nodes are provided unique IDs, but these are treated as comparable black boxes, preventing them from leaking information about the network size. (We will later discuss how to remove the unique ID assumption.) It tolerates any number of crash faults.
Algorithm 1
Counter Race Consensus (for node u with UID id u and initial value v u ) Initialization:
u paired with value 0 (default to 0 if no such elements) c (1) u ← max counter in C ′ u paired with value 1 (default to 0 if no such elements) ifĉ
if phase % c = 1 then with probability 1/n u active ← true otherwise active ← f alse if newm = (decide, * ) or active = true then bcast(newm) else bcast(nop, id u , n u ) On Receiving Message m: 
Algorithm Description
The counter race consensus algorithm is described in pseudocode in the figures labeled Algorithm 1 and 2. Here we summarize the behavior formalized by this pseudocode. The core idea of this algorithm is that each node u maintains a counter c u (initialized to 0) and a proposal v u (initialized to its consensus initial value). Node u repeatedly broadcasts c u and v u , updating these values before each broadcast. That is, during the ack event for its last broadcast of c u and v u , node u will apply a set of update rules to these values. It then concludes the ack event by broadcasting these updated values. This pattern repeats until u arrives at a state where it can safely commit to deciding a value.
The update rules and decision criteria applied during the ack event are straightforward. Each node u first calculatesĉ
u , the largest counter value it has sent or received in a message containing proposal value 0, andĉ (1) u , the largest counter value it has sent or received in a message containing proposal value 1.
Ifĉ
u , then u sets v u ← 0, and ifĉ
That is, u adopts the proposal that is currently "winning" the counter race (in case of a tie, it does not change its proposal).
Node u then checks to see if either value is winning by a large enough margin to support a decision. In more detail, ifĉ (0) u ≥ĉ (1) u + 3, then u commits to deciding 0, and ifĉ What happens next depends on whether or not u committed to a decision. If u did not commit to a decision (captured in the if newm = ⊥ then conditional), then it must update its counter value. To do so, it compares its current counter c u toĉ
u . If c u is smaller than one of these counters, it sets c u ← max{ĉ (0) u ,ĉ (1) u }. Otherwise, if c u is the largest counter that u has sent or received so far, it will set c u ← c u + 1. Either way, its counter increases. At this point, u can complete the ack event by broadcasting a message containing its newly updated c u and v u values.
On the other hand, if u committed to deciding value b, then it will send a (decide, b) message to inform the other nodes of its decision. On subsequently receiving an ack for this message, u will decide b and halt. Similarly, if u ever receives a (decide, b) message from another node, it will commit to deciding b. During its next ack event, it will send its own (decide, b) message and decide and halt on its corresponding ack. That is, node u will not decide a value until it has broadcast its commitment to do so, and received an ack on the broadcast.
The behavior described above guarantees agreement and validity. It is not sufficient, however, to achieve liveness, as an ill-tempered scheduler can conspire to keep the race between 0 and 1 too close for a decision commitment. To overcome this issue we introduce a random delay strategy that has nodes randomly step away from the race for a while by replacing their broadcast values with nop placeholders ignored by those who receive them. Because our adversary does not learn the content of broadcast messages, it does not know which nodes are actively participating and which nodes are taking a break (as in both cases, nodes continually broadcast messages)-thwarting its ability to effectively manipulate the race.
In more detail, each node u partitions its broadcasts into groups of size 6. At the beginning of each such group, u flips a weighted coin to determine whether or not to replace the counter and proposal values it broadcasts during this group with nop placeholders-eliminating its ability to affect other nodes' counter/proposal values. As we will later elaborate in the liveness analysis, the goal is to identify a point in the execution in which a single node v is broadcasting its values while all other nodes are broadcasting nop values-allowing v to advance its proposal sufficiently far ahead to win the race.
To be more specific about the probabilities used in this logic, node u maintains an estimate n u of the number of nodes in the network. It replaces values with nop placeholders in a given group with probability 1/n u . (In the pseudocode, the active flag indicates whether or not u is using nop placeholders in the current group.) Node u initializes n u to 2. It then updates it by calling the updateEstimate routine (described in Algorithm 2) for each message it receives.
There are two ways for this routine to update n u . The first is if the number of unique IDs that u has received so far (stored in peers) is larger than n u . In this case, it sets n u ← |peers|. The second way is if it learns another node has an estimate n ′ > n u . In this case, it sets n u ← n ′ . Node u learns about other nodes' estimates, as the algorithm has each node append its current estimate to all of its messages (with the exception of decide messages). In essence, the nodes are running a network size estimation routine parallel to its main counter race logic-as nodes refine their estimates, their probability of taking useful breaks improves.
Safety
We begin our analysis by proving that our algorithm satisfies the agreement and validity properties of the consensus problem. Validity follows directly from the algorithm description. Our strategy to prove agreement is to show that if any node sees a value b with a counter at least 3 ahead of value 1 − b (causing it to commit to deciding b), then b is the only possible decision value. Race arguments of this type are easier to prove in a shared memory setting where nodes work with objects like atomic registers that guarantee linearization points. In our message passing setting, by contrast, in which broadcast messages arrive at different receivers at different times, we will require more involved definitions and operational arguments. 5 We start with a useful definition. We say b dominates 1 − b at a given point in the execution, if every (non-crashed) node at this point believes b is winning the race, and none of the messages in transit can change this perception.
To formalize this notion we need some notation. In the following, we say at point t (or at t), with respect to an event t from the message schedule of an execution α, to describe the state of the system immediately after event t (and any associated steps that execute atomically with t) occurs. We also use the notation in transit at t to describe messages that have been broadcast but not yet received at every non-crashed receiver at t. Proof. In this proof, we focus on the suffix of the message schedule msg[α] that begins with event t. For simplicity, we label these events E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , ..., with E 1 = t. We will prove the lemma by induction on this sequence.
The base case (E 1 ) follows directly from the lemma statement. For the inductive step, we must show that if α is (b, c)-dominated at point E i , then it will be dominated at E i+1 as well. By the inductive hypothesis, we assume the execution is dominated immediately before E i+1 occurs. Therefore, the only way the step is violated is if E i+1 transitions the system from dominated to non-dominated status. We consider all possible cases for E i+1 and show none of them can cause such a transition.
The first case is if E i+1 is a crash u event for some node u. It is clear that a crash cannot transition a system into non-dominated status.
The second case is if E i+1 is a recv(m) u event for some node u. This event can only transition the system into a non-dominated status if m is a counter message that includes 1 − b and a counter c ′ > c. For u to receive this message, however, means that the message was in transit immediately before E i+1 occurs. Because we assume the system is dominated at E i , however, no such message can be in transit at this point (by condition 2 of the domination definition).
The third and final case is if E i+1 is a ack(m) u event for some node u, that is combined with a bcast(m ′ ) u event, where m ′ is a counter message that includes 1 − b and a counter c ′ > c. Consider the valuesĉ
set by node u early in the steps associated with this ack(m) u event. By our inductive hypothesis, which tells us that the execution is dominated right before this ack(m) u event occurs, it must follow thatĉ
In the steps that immediately follow, therefore, node u will set v u ← b. It is therefore impossible for u to then broadcast a counter message with value v u = 1 − b.
To prove agreement, we are left to show that if a node commits to deciding some value b, then it must be the case that b dominates the execution at this point-making it the only possible decision going forward. The following helper lemma, which captures a useful property about counters, will prove crucial for establishing this point. Proof. Fix some t, α, v and m = (counter, id v , c, b, n v ), as specified by the lemma statement. Let t ′ be the first event in α such that at t ′ some node w has local counter c w ≥ c and value v w = b. We know at least one such event exists as t and v satisfy the above conditions, so the earliest such event, t ′ , is well-defined. Furthermore, because t ′ must modify local counter and/or consensus values, it must also be an ack event.
For the purposes of this argument, let c w and v w be w's counter and consensus value, respectively, immediately before t ′ is scheduled. Similarly, let c ′ w and v ′ w be these values immediately after t ′ and its steps complete (i.e., these values at point t ′ ). By assumption: c ′ w ≥ c and v ′ w = b. We proceed by studying the possibilities for c w and v w and their relationships with c ′ w and v ′ w . We begin by considering v w . We want to argue that v w = b. To see why this is true, assume for contradiction that v w = 1 − b. It follows that early in the steps for t ′ , node w switches its consensus value from 1 − b to b. By the definition of the algorithm, it only does this if at this point in the ack steps:ĉ w < c. This contradicts the assumption that c ′ w ≥ c. At this checkpoint in our argument we have argued that v w = b. We now consider c w . If c w ≥ c, then w starts t ′ with a sufficiently big counter-contradicting the assumption that t ′ is the earliest such event. It follows that c w < c and w must increase this value during this event.
There are two ways to increase a counter; i.e., the two conditions in the if/else-if statement that follows the newm = ⊥ check. We start with the second condition. If max{ĉ To conclude our argument, consider the implications of the m = nop component of this condition. It follows that t ′ is an ack(m) w for an actual message m. It cannot be the case that m is a decide message, as w will not increase its counter on acknowledging a decide. Therefore, m is a counter message. Furthermore, because counter and consensus values are not modified after broadcasting a counter message but before receiving its subsequent acknowledgment, we know m = (counter, id w , c w , v w , * ) = (counter, id w , c − 1, b, * ) (we replace the network size estimate with a wildcard here as these estimates could change during this period).
Because w has an acknowledgment for this m, by the definition of the model, prior to t ′ : every non-crashed node received a counter message with counter c − 1 and consensus value b. This is exactly the claim we are trying to prove.
Our main safety theorem leverages the above two lemmas to establish that committing to decide b means that b dominates the execution. The key idea is that counter values cannot become too stale. By Lemma 3.3, if some node has a counter c associated with proposal value 1 − b, then all nodes have seen a counter of size at least c − 1 associated with 1 − b. It follows that if some node thinks b is far ahead, then all nodes must think b is far ahead in the race (i.e., b dominates). Proof. Validity follows directly from the definition of the algorithm. To establish agreement, fix some execution α that includes at least one decision. Let t be the first ack event in α that is combined with a broadcast of a decide message. We call such a step a pre-decision step as it prepares nodes to decide in a later step. Let u be the node at which this ack occurs and b be the value it includes in the decide message. Because we assume at least one process decides in α, we know t exists. We also know it occurs before any decision.
During the steps associated with t, u sets newm ← (decide, b). This indicates the following is true:ĉ
Based on this condition, we establish two claims about the system at t, expressed with respect to the valueĉ (1−b) u during these steps:
• Claim 1. The largest counter included with value 1−b in a counter message broadcast 6 before t is no more thanĉ
Assume for contradiction that before t some v broadcast a counter message with value 1 − b and counter c >ĉ
By Lemma 3.3, it follows that before t every non-crashed node receives a counter message with value 1 − b and counter c − 1 ≥ĉ
This set of nodes includes u. This contradicts our assumption that at t the largest counter u has seen associated with 1 − b isĉ
• Claim 2. Before t, every non-crashed node has sent or received a counter message with value b and counter at leastĉ
By assumption on the values u has seen at t, we know that before t some node v broadcast a counter message with value b and counter c ≥ĉ
. By Lemma 3.3, it follows that before t, every node has sent or received a counter with value b and counter c − 1 ≥ĉ
Notice that claim 1 combined with claim 2 implies that the execution is (b,ĉ (1−b) u +1)-dominated before t. By Lemma 3.2, the execution will remain dominated from this point forward. We assume t was the first pre-decision, and it will lead u to tell other nodes to decide u before doing so itself. Other pre-decision steps might occur, however, before all nodes have received u's preference for b. With this in mind, let t ′ be any other pre-decision step. Because t ′ comes after t it will occur in a (b,ĉ (1−b) u + 1)-dominated system. This means that during the first steps of t ′ , the node will adopt b as its value (if it has not already done so), meaning it will also promote b.
To conclude, we have shown that once any node reaches a pre-decision step for a value b, then the system is already dominated in favor of b, and therefore b is the only possible decision value going forward. Agreement follows directly.
Liveness
We now turn our attention liveness. Our goal is to prove the following theorem: Theorem 3.5. With high probability, within O(n 3 ln n) scheduled ack events, every node executing counter race consensus has either crashed, decided, or received a decide message. In the limit, this termination condition occurs with probability 1.
Notice that this theorem does not require a fair schedule. It guarantees its termination criteria (with high probability) after any O(n 3 ln n) scheduled ack events, regardless of which nodes these events occur at. Once the system arrives at a state in which every node has either crashed, decided, or received a decide message, the execution is now univalent (only one decision value is possible going forward), and each non-crashed node u will decide after at most two additional ack events at u. 7 Our liveness proof is longer and more involved than our safety proof. This follows, in part, from the need to introduce multiple technical definitions to help identify the execution fragments sufficiently well-behaved for us to apply our probabilistic arguments. With this in mind, we divide the presentation of our liveness proof into two parts. The first part introduces the main ideas of the analysis and provides a road map of sorts to its component pieces. The second part, which contains the details, can be found in the full paper [44] .
Main Ideas
Here we discuss the main ideas of our liveness proof. A core definition used in our analysis is the notion of an x-run. Roughly speaking, for a given constant integer x ≥ 2 and node u, we say an execution fragment β is an x-run for some node u, if it starts and ends with an ack event for u, it contains x total ack events for u, and no other node has more than x ack events interleaved. We deploy a recursive counting argument to establish that an execution fragment β that contains at least n · x total ack events, must contain a sub-fragment β ′ that is an x-run for some node u.
To put this result to use, we focus our attention on (2c + 1)-runs, where c = 6 is the constant used in the algorithm definition to define the length of a group (see Section 3.1 for a reminder of what a group is and how it is used by the algorithm). A straightforward argument establishes that a (2c + 1)-run for some node u must contain at least one complete group for u-that is, it must contain all c broadcasts of one of u's groups.
Combining these observations, it follows that if we partition an execution into segments of length n ·(2c+ 1), each such segment i contains a (2c+ 1)-run for some node u i , and each such run contains a complete group for u i . We call this complete group the target group t i for segment i (if there are multiple complete groups in the run, choose one arbitrarily to be the target).
These target groups are the core unit to which our subsequent analysis applies. Our goal is to arrive at a target group t i that is clean in the sense that u i is active during the group (i.e., sends its actual values instead of nop placeholders), and all broadcasts that arrive at u during this group come from non-active nodes (i.e., these received messages contain nop placeholders instead of values). If we achieve a clean group, then it is not hard to show that u i will advance its counter at least k ahead of all other counters, pushing all other nodes into the termination criteria guaranteed by Theorem 3.5.
To prove clean groups are sufficiently likely, our analysis must overcome two issues. The first issue concerns network size estimations. Fix some target group t i . Let P i be the nodes from which u i receives at least one message during t i . If all of these nodes have a network size estimate of at least n i = |P i | at the start of t i , we say the group is calibrated. We prove that if t i is calibrated, then it is clean with a probability in Ω(1/n).
The key, therefore, is proving most target groups are calibrated. To do so, we note that if some t i is not calibrated, it means at least one node used an estimate strictly less than n i when it probabilistically defined active at the beginning of this group. During this group, however, all nodes will receive broadcasts from at least n i unique nodes, increasing all network estimates to size at least n i . 8 Therefore, each target group that fails to be calibrated increases the minimum network size estimate in the system by at least 1. It follows that at most n target groups can be non-calibrated.
The second issue concerns probabilistic dependencies. Let E i be the event that target group t i is clean and E j be the event that some other target group t j is clean. Notice that E i and E j are not necessarily independent. If a node u has a group that overlaps both t i and t j , then its probabilistic decision about whether or not to be active in this group impacts the potential cleanliness of both t i and t j .
Our analysis tackles these dependencies by identifying a subset of target groups that are pairwise independent. To do so, roughly speaking, we process our target groups in order. Starting with the first target group, we mark as unavailable any future target group that overlaps this first group (in the sense described above). We then proceed until we arrive at the next target group not marked unavailable and repeat the process. Each available target group marks at most O(n) future groups as unavailable. Therefore, given a sufficiently large set T of target groups, we can identify a subset T ′ , with a size in Ω(|T |/n), such that all groups in T ′ are pairwise independent.
We can now pull together these pieces to arrive at our main liveness complexity claim. Consider the first O(n 3 ln n) ack events in an execution. We can divide these into O(n 2 ln n) segments of length (2c + 1)n ∈ Θ(n). We now consider the target groups defined by these segments. By our above argument, there is a subset T ′ of these groups, where |T ′ | ∈ Ω(n ln n), and all target groups in T ′ are mutually independent. At most n of these remaining target groups are not calibrated. If we discard these, we are left with a slightly smaller set, of size still Ω(n ln n), that contains only calibrated and pairwise independent target groups.
We argued that each calibrated group has a probability in Ω(1/n) of being clean. Leveraging the independence between our identified groups, a standard concentration analysis establishes with high probability in n that at least one of these Ω(n/ ln n) groups is clean-satisfying the Theorem statement.
Full Analysis
Our proof of Theorem 3.5 proceeds in two steps. The first step introduces useful notation for describing parts of message schedules, and proves some deterministic properties regarding these concepts. The second step leverages these definitions and properties in making the core probabilistic arguments.
Definitions and Deterministic Properties
Each node keeps a counter called phase. This counter is initialized to 0 and is incremented with each ack event. Given a message schedule and node u, we can divide the schedule into phases with respect to u based on u's local phase counter. In more detail, label the ack u events in the schedule, a 1 , a 2 , a 3 .... For each i ≥ 1, we define phase i (with respect to u) to be the schedule fragment that starts with acknowledgment a i and includes all events up to but not including a i+1 . If no such a i+1 exists (i.e., if a i is the last ack u event in the execution), we consider phase i undefined and consider u to only have i − 1 phases in this schedule. Notice, by our model definition, during a given phase i, all non-crashed nodes receive the message broadcast as part of the ack that starts the phase.
We partition a given node u's phases into groups, which we define with respect to the constant c used in the algorithm definition as part of the logic for resetting the nodes' active flag. In particular, we partition the phases into groups of size c.
Notice, by the definition of our algorithm, a node only updates its active flag at the beginning of each group. Therefore, the messages sent by a give node during a given one of its groups are either all nop messages, or all non-nop messages. We now introduce the higher level concept of a run, which will prove useful going forward. We now show that for any x, any sufficiently long (defined with respect to x) fragment from a message schedule will contain an x-run for some node: Proof. Because γ contains n · x total acks, a straightforward counting argument provides that at least one node v has at least x acks in γ. Consider the the subsequence γ ′ of γ that starts with the first ack v event and ends with the x th such ack v event. (That is, we remove the prefix of γ before the first ack v and the suffix after the x th ack v event.)
It is clear that γ ′ satisfies the first properties of our definition of an x-run for v. If it also satisfies the third property (that no other node has more than x acks in γ ′ ), then we are done: setting β ← γ ′ satisfies the lemma statement.
On the other hand, if γ ′ does not satisfy the third property, there must exist some node u that has more than x ack events in γ ′ . In this case, we can apply the above argument recursively to u and γ ′ , identifying a subsequence of γ ′ that starts with the first ack u and ends after the x th such event. The resulting γ ′′ satisfies the first two properties of the definition of an x-run for u. If it also satisfies the third property, we are done. Otherwise, we can recurse again on γ ′′ .
Because each such recursive application of this argument strictly reduces the size of the subsequence (at the very least, you are trimming off the first and last ack), and the original γ has a bounded number of events, the recursion must eventually arrive at a subsequence that satisfies all three properties of the x-run definition.
We next prove an additional useful property of x-runs. In particular, a (2c + 1)-run defined for some node u is long enough that it must contain all phases of at least one of u's groups. Identifying complete groups of this type will be key to the later probabilistic algorithms. Proof. Because x = 2c + 1, β must contain at least 2c + 1 ack u events. It follows that it contains at least 2c of node u's phases (extra final ack of the 2c + 1 ensures that all of the events that define phase 2c of the run are included in the run). Because each node u group consists of c phases, any sequence of 2c phases must include all c phase of at least one full group.
We next introduce the notion of a clean group, and establish that the occurence of a clean group guarantees that we arrive at the termination state from our main theorem. Definition 3.9. Let β be a complete group for some node u. We say β is clean if the following two properties are satisfied:
1. Node u sets active to true at the beginning of the group described by β. Proof. Fix some α, β and u as specified by the lemma statement. Let b be the consensus value u adopts for the first phase of the clean group. Because u only receives nop messages during all but the last phase of a clean group, we know u will not change this value again in this group until (potentially) the last phase. As we will now argue, however, it will have already decided before this last phase, so the fact that u might receive values in that phase is inconsequential. In more detail, letĉ
For every recv u (m) event that occurs in the first
be the largest counter values that u has seen for b and 1 − b, respectively, by the time it completes the ack that begins the first phase. Because we just assumed that u adopts b at this point, we knowĉ
. Furthermore, because u only receives nop messages, we know that in every phase starting with phase 2 of the group, u will either increment the counter associated b or send a decide message. The largest counter associated with 1 − b will not increase beyondĉ
during these phases. It follows that if u has not yet sent a decide message by the start of phase k + 2, it will see during the ack event that starts this phase that its largest counter for b is k larger than the largest counter for 1− b. Accordingly, during this phase u will send a decide message. During the ack event that starts k + 3, u will receive this ack and decide. At this point, all other nodes have received its decide message as well. Because this is the last phase of the group, it is possible that u receives non-nop messages from other nodes-but at this point, this is too late to have an impact as u has already decided and halted. (It is here that we see why k + 3 is the right value for the group length c.)
Randomized Analysis In Part 1 of this analysis we introduced several useful definitions and execution properties. These culminated with the argument in Lemma 3.10 that if we ever get a clean group in an execution, then we will have achieved the desired termination property. Our goal in this second part of the analysis is to leverage the tools from the preceding part to prove, with high probability, that the algorithm will generate a clean group after not too many acks are scheduled.
On Network Size Assumptions. If n = 1, then all that is required for the single node u to experience a clean group is for it to set active to true. By Lemma 3.10, it will then decide and halt in the group that follows. By the definition of the algorithm, this occurs with probability 1/2 at the beginning of each group, as u initializes n u ← 2, and this will never change. Therefore: with high probability, u will decide within O(log n) groups (and therefore, O(c log n) scheduled acks), and with probability 1, it will decide in the limit. This satisfies our liveness theorem. In the analysis that follows, therefore, we will assume n > 1.
On Independence Between the Schedule and Random Choices. According to our model assumptions (Section 2), the scheduler is provided no advance information about the nodes' state or the contents of the messages they send. All the scheduler learns is the input assignment, and whether or not a given node sent some message (but not the message contents) as part of the steps it takes for a given init or recv event. By the definition of our algorithm, however, until it halts, each node sends a message when initialized and after every ack, regardless of its random choices or the specific contents of the messages its receives. It follows that the scheduler learns nothing new about the nodes' states beyond their input values until the first node halts-at which point, some additional information might be inferred. For a node to halt, however, means it has already sent a decide message and received an ack for this message, meaning that we have already satisfied the desired termination property at this point. Accordingly, in the analysis that follows, we can treat the scheduler's choices as independent of the nodes' random choices. This allows us to fix the schedule first and then reason probabilistically about the messages sent during the schedule, without worrying about dependence between the schedule and those choices. 9 In analyzing the probability of a group ending up clean, a key property is whether or not the nodes participating in that group all have good estimates of the network size (e.g., their n v values used in setting their active flags). We call a group with good estimates a calibrated group. The formal definition of this property requires some care to ensure it exactly matches how we later study it: Definition 3.11. Fix an execution α. Let β be a complete group for some node u in the message schedule msg [α] . Let P β be the set of nodes that have at least one of their messages received by u in the first c − 1 phases of u's group, let n β = |P β |, and for each v ∈ P β , let t v be the event in msg [α] that starts the node v group that sends the first of its messages received by u in β. We say that group β is calibrated if for every v ∈ P β : the value n v used in event t v to probabilistically set v's active flag is of size at least n β . Notice in the above that if P β is empty than the property is vacuously true. Another key property of calibration is that it is determined entirely by the message schedule. That is, given an prefix of a message schedule, you can correctly determine the network size estimation of all nodes at the end of that prefix without needing to know anything about their input values or random choices. This follows because network size estimates are based on two things: the number of UIDs from which you have received messages (of any type), and other nodes' reported estimates (which are included on all message types). As argued above, the only thing impacted by the node random choices and inputs are the types of messages they send, not when they send.
Therefore, given a message schedule and a group within the message schedule, we can determine whether or not that group is calibrated independent of the nodes' random choices, supporting the following: Lemma 3.12. Let α be a message schedule generated by the scheduler. Let β be a (2c + 1)-run for some node u in α, and γ be a complete group for u in β. If γ is calibrated, then the probability that γ is clean is at least 1/(64n).
Proof. Fix some α, γ and β and u as specified by the lemma statement. Fix P γ , n γ , and the t v events, as specified in our definition of calibrated (Definition 3.11).
We note that if P γ is empty, then the only condition that must hold for γ to be clean is for u to set active to true. This occurs with probability 1/n u ≥ 1/n > 1/(64n)-satisfying the lemma.
Continuing, we consider the case where P γ is non-empty. Fix any v ∈ P γ . We begin by bounding the total number of v's groups that might send a message that is received by u in γ. To do so, we note that because γ is a (2c + 1)-run, v cannot have more than 2c + 1 ack events in γ. Therefore, no more than 3 of v's groups can overlap γ (as each group requires c ack events), and therefore there are at most 3 groups that both overlap γ and deliver a message from v to u in this group.
We now lower bound the probability that v sets active to f alse (and therefore only sends nop messages to u) at the beginning of all of these groups. We consider two cases based on the value of n γ . If n γ = 1, then the fact that this group is calibrated only tells us that n v ≥ 1-which is not useful. In this case, however, we note that the definition of the algorithm guarantees that n v ≥ 2, as it initializes n v to 2 and these estimates never decrease. We can therefore crudely lower bound the probability that v sets active to f alse in all overlapping groups, by noting that it must be at least (1 − 1/n v ) 3 ≥ (1 − 1/2) 3 = 1/8 > 1/(64n)-satisfying the lemma.
We now consider the case where n γ > 1. In this case, we leverage the definition of calibrated, which tells us that at the beginning of the first of these overlapping groups, v has a network estimate n v ≥ n γ , and that this remains true for all overlapping groups as these estimates never decrease. Therefore, the probability that v delivers only nop messages to u during the first c − 1 phases of γ is at least:
Combining the above probability with the straightforward observation that u is active during γ with probability at least 1/n (as n is the largest possible network size estimate), yields the following probability that γ is clean:
as required by the lemma statement.
We have established that if a group is calibrated then it has a good chance (≈ 1/n) of being clean and therefore ensuring termination. To leverage this result, however, we must overcome two issues. The first is proving that calibrated groups are sufficiently common in a given schedule. The second is dealing with dependencies between different groups. Assume, for example, we want to calculate the probability that at least one group from among a collection of target groups is clean. Assume some node u has a group that overlaps multiple groups in this collection. If u sets active to true in this group this reduces the probability of cleanliness for several groups in this collection. In other words, cleanness probability is not necessarily independent between different target groups.
On Good Target Groups. We overcomes these challenges by proving that any sufficiently long message schedule must contain a sufficient number of calibrated and pairwise independent target groups.
To do so, let α be some message schedule generated by the scheduler that contains qnx ack events, where x = 2c + 1 and q = n + gn 2 c ln n, for any constant g ≥ 512. Partition this schedule in q segments each containing nx ack events. Label these segments s 1 , s 2 , ..., s q .
By Lemma 3.7, each segment s i contains an x-run for some node u i . Applying Lemma 3.8, it follows that this x-run contains at least one complete group for u i . We call this complete group the target group for s i , and label it t i . (If there are more than one complete groups for u i in the x-run, then we set t i to the first such group in the run.) Let T = {t 1 , t 2 , ..., t q } be the complete set of these target groups.
We turn our attention to this set T of target groups. To study their useful for inducing termination, we will use the notion of calibrated introduced earlier, as well as the following formal notion of non-overlapping: Definition 3.13. Fix two target groups t i and t j . We say t i and t j are non-overlapping if there does not exist a group that has at least one recv event in t i and t j . If t i and t j are not non-overlapping, then we say they overlap.
Our goal is to identify a subset of these target groups that are good-a property which we define with respect to calibration and non-overlapping properties as follows: Definition 3.14. Let T ′ ⊆ T be a subset of the q target groups. We say the groups in T ′ are good if: (1) every t i ∈ T ′ is calibrated; and (2) for every t i , t j ∈ T ′ , where i = j, t i and t j are non-overlapping.
Notice that both the calibration and non-overlapping status of groups are a function entirely of the message schedule. Therefore, given a message schedule, we can partition it into segments and target groups as described above, and label the status of these target groups without needing to consider the nodes' random bits.
To do so, we first prove a useful bound on the prevalence of calibration in T . The core idea in the following is that every time a target group fails calibration, all nodes increase their network estimates. Clearly, this can only occur n times before all estimates are the maximum possible value of n, after which calibration is trivial. We then apply this result in making a more involved argument that on the frequency of good groups. Proof. Fix some t i ∈ T that is not calibrated. Let P i be the set of nodes that deliver at least one message to u i in the first c − 1 phases of t i . By the definition of calibration, if t i is not calibrated, then at least one node v ∈ P i starts its relevant group with a network estimate n v < |P i |.
During the first c − 1 phases of t i , node u i receives a message from every node in P i (this is the definition of P i ). This means that by the start of the final phase of t i , u i 's network estimate is of size at least |P i |. The message that u i sends in the final phase therefore will be labelled with this network size. By the end of this final phase, all non-crashed processes will have received this estimate. Therefore, all these processes will update their network size to be at least |P i | at the beginning of their next phases.
At this point, |P i | is now a minimum network size for the entire network. Therefore, if a subsequent group t j is not calibrated, then it must be the case that |P j | > |P i |, and by the end of this group, the minimum network size for the entire network will increase to at least |P j |. Clearly, this increase process can happen at most n times before the entire network has the maximum possible network size of n, and every subsequent target group is trivially calibrated. Proof. Fix some T as specified by the lemma statement. We approach this proof from an algorithmic perspective. That is, we describe below an algorithm that identifies a good subset T ′ of T , and then argue the subset produced by the algorithm is sufficiently large.
We argue that T ′ is good. First we note that by the definition of the algorithm, when a label gets set to bad it can never again be changed back to good.
Next we note that if ℓ i = good when T ′ is defined in the final step, then it could not be the case that ℓ i was set to bad in the first for loop, as, by our first note, this would ensure that ℓ i remained bad. Therefore, ℓ i must have been set to good in the first for loop, indicating it is calibrated. Now we consider overlaps. If ℓ i ends up good then it must have been good when the second for loop arrived at this value. It follows that no preceding group overlaps t i . During this iteration, the nested for loop will permanently set to bad and succeeding target groups that t i overlaps. Combined, it follows that if ℓ i = good at this point, then for every t j that overlaps t i (i = j), ℓ j = bad before the second for loop completes.
We conclude that T ′ is a good subset of T . We now consider its sizes. By Lemma 3.15, we know that the first for loop marks at most n groups bad with the rest initialized to good. Now consider an iteration i of the second for loop that finds ℓ i = good. We can bound the number of groups the inner for loop then sets to bad. For each v = u i , v can have at most one group that delivers messages to both t i and future groups. Call this group g v . Because g v delivers c total messages, the maximum number of future groups it can deliver messages to is at most c − 1. In the worst case, each v = u i therefore causes no more than c − 1 future groups to be labelled bad. There are n − 1 total possible nodes, so at most (n − 1)(c − 1) future groups get labelled bad for each good group identified by the second for loop. Therefore, if we divide these groups by (n − 1)(c − 1) + 1, we get a lower bound on the number of good groups that remain:
as claimed by the lemma statement.
The target groups in the set T ′ identified by Lemma 3.16 are calibrated and pairwise nonoverlapping. By Lemma 3.12, each such group has a reasonable probability of being clean. We will conclude our analysis by arguing that with high probability at least one will end up clean. Proof. Fix some T ′ as specified by the lemma statement. We describe the cleanliness of each t i ∈ T ′ with a random indicator variable X i , where X i = 1 indicates t i is clean, and X i = 0 indicates it is not clean. By Lemma 3.12, we know that for each t i ∈ T ′ : P(X i = 1) ≥ 1/(64n).
We next argue that these random variables are independent. To see why, notice that the only random choices made by a given node when reseting active at the start of each group. Each such choice is made with independent randomness: i.e., the choice for one group is independent from the choice made for any other group. For any t i , t j ∈ T ′ , where i = j, by the definition T ′ , there are no groups that overlap both t i and t j . Therefore, the random choices relevant to determine if t i is clean are distinct from the random choices that will determine if t j is clean. It follows that X i and X j are independent.
Let Y = t i ∈T ′ X i be the total number of clean groups. It follows by linearity of expectation, Lemma 3.12, and our assumption on the size of T ′ :
Because the X indicators are independent, we can apply a Chernoff bound to concentrate around this expectation. 10 In particular, let µ = E(Y ) ≥ (g/64) ln n. We bound the probability that Y is a constant factor smaller than expected:
≤ 1/n 10 We use the following loose form of the bound that holds for
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Given our assumption on g, we know µ/2 ≥ 1. Therefore, P r(Y ≤ µ/2) is less than or equal to the probability that no group is clean.
We can now pull together the pieces to prove our main liveness result (Theorem 3.5):
Proof (of Theorem 3.5) . We handled the case where n = 1 at the beginning of the liveness analysis. Here we consider only n > 1, the case for which the above lemma hold. To prove the first part of the theorem, fix some constant g ≥ 512, and define q and x as in the above definitions of segments and target groups. Consider the first qnx = (n + gn 2 c ln n) · n · (2c + 1) = Θ(n 3 ln n) ack events of the message schedule generated by the scheduler. We can extract a set T containing q target groups from this prefix of the message schedule as described above.
By Lemma 3.16, there exists a subset T ′ ⊆ T such that the groups in T ′ are good and |T ′ | ≥ gn ln n. By Lemma 3.17, with high probability, at least one of these target groups is clean. Finally, by Lemma 3.10: if any group is clean, then by the end of that group every process has either crashed, decided, or received a decide message.
The second part of the theorem, which addresses termination in the limit, we first note that if we continually apply the argument from Lemma 3.17 to fresh batches of groups, the probability that we do not generate a clean group approaches 0 in the limit. Combined with Lemma 3.10, this provides the needed probabilistic termination condition.
Removing the Assumption of Unique IDs
The consensus algorithm described in this section assumes unique IDs. We now show how to eliminate this assumption by describing a strategy that generates unique IDs w.h.p., and discuss how to use this as a subroutine in our consensus algorithm.
We make use of a simple tiebreaking mechanism as follows: Each node u proceeds by iteratively extending a (local) random bit string that eventually becomes unique among the nodes. Initially, u broadcasts bit b 1 , which is initialized to 1 (at all nodes), and each time u samples a new bit b, it appends b to its current string and broadcasts the result. We first show that the algorithm is safe in the sense that no two nodes ever assign themselves the same ID:
Lemma 3.18. Suppose that nodes u and v both terminate Algorithm 3. Then it holds that id
Proof. Consider an execution α and the corresponding message schedule msg [α] . Suppose, in contrary, that id u = id v . Let r u and r v denote the number of acks that u respectively v receive before assigning an ID and, without loss of generality, assume r u ≤ r v . Clearly, if r u < r v , then id v is at least one bit longer than id u , thus id v > id u . Now suppose that r u = r v , i.e., both u and v receive the same number of acks. Let t u and t v be the events in msg [α] where u and v receive their respective r u -th ack and, without loss of generality, assume that t u precedes t v in msg [α] . By assumption, u was non-faulty until receiving its ack in event t u and hence v must have received u's broadcast message (id u ) before receiving its own ack in step t v . Since u and v have generated Algorithm 3 Generating unique IDs using randomized tiebreaking. Code for node u.
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adopt id u as ID and terminate
the same bits by assumption, the if-conditional ensures that v samples at least one additional bit compared to u, providing a contradiction.
Next, we show liveness in Lemma 3.19 by arguing that each node receives an ID within its first O(log n) broadcast events with high probability.
Lemma 3.19. With high probability, each node broadcasts at most O(log n) times before choosing an ID in Line 6 of Algorithm 3.
Proof. Consider an execution α and assume, towards a contradiction, that a node u executes at least ⌈4 log 2 n⌉ + 2 broadcasts. Let (b 1 . . . b ⌈4 log 2 n⌉+1 ) be the (⌈4 log 2 n⌉ + 1)-length bit string broadcast by u, and let t be the event where u receives ack(b 1 . . . b ⌈4 log 2 n⌉+1 ) for the corresponding broadcast. By assumption, u does not pass the if-condition in event t and thus there is a set of nodes W (u / ∈ W ) that also broadcast bit strings of length ⌈4 log 2 n⌉ + 1 and whose messages are received by u before event t. While the first bit b 1 is initialized to 1 by every node, the string b 2 . . . b ⌈4 log 2 n⌉+1 ) corresponds to a uniform random sample from a range of size at least n 4 . The probability that v has sampled precisely the same ⌈4 log 2 n⌉ bits as u (and hence broadcast (b 1 b 2 . . . b ⌈4 log 2 n⌉+1 )) is at most 1 n 4 . Taking a union bound over all other nodes in W and over all possible choices for u, shows that all nodes will execute at most ⌈4 log 2 n + 1⌉ broadcasts with high probability.
From the previous two lemmas, we obtain the following result: Theorem 3.20. Consider an execution α of the tiebreaking algorithm. Let t u be an event in the message schedule msg [α] such that node u is scheduled for Ω(log n) ack events before t u . Then, for each correct node u, it holds that u has a unique ID of O(log n) bits with high probability at t u .
Equipped with Theorem 3.20 we can execute the consensus algorithm in networks without unique IDs, by instructing each node u to first execute Algorithm 3, while locally buffering all messages received from nodes already executing the consensus algorithm; however, u does not yet process these messages. Once u obtains an ID, it performs the initialization step of the consensus algorithm and locally simulates taking receive steps for all previously buffered messages.
Almost-Everywhere Agreement
In the previous section, we showed how to solve consensus in O(n 3 log n) events. Here we show how to improve this bound by a near linear factor by loosening the agreement guarantees. In more detail, we consider a weaker variant of consensus, introduced in [18] , called almost-everywhere agreement. This variation relaxes the agreement property of consensus such that o(n) nodes are allowed to decide on conflicting values, as long as the remaining nodes all decide the same value. For many problems that use consensus as a subroutine, this relaxed agreement property is sufficient.
In more detail, we present an algorithm for solving almost-everywhere agreement in the abstract MAC layer model when nodes start with arbitrary (not necessarily binary) input values. The algorithm consists of two phases; see Algorithm 4 for the pseudo code. Phase 1: In this phase, nodes try to obtain an estimate of the network size by performing local coin flipping experiments. Each node u records in a variable X the number of times that its coin comes up tails before observing the first heads. Then, u broadcasts its value of X once, and each node updates X to the highest outcome that it has seen until it receives the ack for its broadcast. We show that, for all nodes in a large set called EST , variable X is an approximation of log 2 (n) with an additive O(log log n) term by the end of Phase 1, and hence N := 2 X is a good approximation of the network size n for any node in EST . Phase 2: Next, we use X and N as parameters of a randomly rotating leader election procedure. Each node decides after T = Θ(N log 3 (N ) log log(N )) rounds, where each round corresponds to one iteration of the for-loop in Algorithm 4. (Note that due to the asynchronous nature of the abstract MAC layer model, different nodes might be executing in different rounds at the same point in time.) We now describe the sequence of steps comprising a round in more detail: A node u becomes active with probability 1/N u at the start of each round. 11 If it is active, then u samples a random rank ρ from a range polynomial in X u , and broadcasts a message r, ρ, val where val refers to its current consensus input value. To ensure that the scheduler cannot derive any information about whether a node is active in a round, inactive nodes simply broadcast a dummy message with infinite rank. While an (active or inactive) node v waits for its ack for round r, it keeps track of all received messages and defers processing of a message sent by a node in some round r ′ > r until the event in which v itself starts round r ′ . On the other hand, if a received message was sent in r ′ < r, then v simply discards that late message as it has already completed r ′ . Node v uses the information of messages originating from the same round r to update its consensus input value, if it receives such a message from an active node that has chosen a smaller rank than its own. (Recall that inactive nodes have infinite rank.) After v has finished processing the received messages, it moves on the next round.
We first provide some intuition why it is insufficient to focus on a round r where the "earliest" node is also active: Ideally, we want the node w 1 that is the first to receive its ack for round r to be active and to have the smallest rank among all active nodes in round r, as this will force all other (not-yet decided) nodes to adopt w 1 's value when receiving their own round r ack, ensuring a.e. agreement. However, it is possible that w 1 and also the node w 2 that receives its round r ack right after w 1 , are among the few nodes that ended up with a small (possibly constant) value of X after Phase 1. We cannot use the size of EST to reason about this probability, as some nodes are much likelier to be in EST than others, depending on the schedule of events in Phase 1. In that case, it could happen that both w 1 and w 2 become active and choose a rank of 1. Note that it is possible that the receive steps of their broadcasts are scheduled such that roughly half of the nodes receive w 1 's message before w 2 's message, while the other half receive w 2 's message first. If w 1 and w 2 have distinct consensus input values, then it can happen that both consensus values gain large support in the network as a result.
To avoid this pitfall, we focus on a set of rounds where all nodes not in EST have already terminated Phase 2 (and possibly decided on a wrong value): from that point onwards, only nodes with sufficiently large values of X and N keep trying to become active. We can show that every node in EST has a probability of at least Ω(1/(n log n)) to become active and a probability of Ω(1/ log n) to have chosen the smallest rank among all nodes that are active in the same round. Thus, when considering a sufficiently large set of (asynchronous) rounds, we can show that the event, where the first node in EST that receives its ack in round r becomes active and also chooses a rank smaller than the rank of any other node active in the same round, happens with probability 1 − o (1) .
In the remainder of this section, we will formalize the above discussion by proving the following main theorem regarding this algorithm: Theorem 4.1. With high probability, the following two properties are true of our almost-everywhere consensus algorithm: (1) within O(n 2 log 4 n · log log n) scheduled ack events, every node has either crashed, decided, or will decided after it is next scheduled; (b) all but at most o(n) nodes that decide, decide the same value.
We begin our proof of Theorem 4.1 by analyzing the properties of variables N and X. We say that a node u fails in round r if u performs its round r broadcast in some event, but crashes before receiving its corresponding ack; otherwise, we say u is alive in r. Note that there is no guarantee about which nodes receive a failing node's final broadcast. (a) for all u ∈ EST , when u receives its ack for its first broadcast, it holds that n log 2 n ≤ N u ≤ n log n and log 2 n − log 2 (log n) ≤ X u ≤ log 2 n + log 2 log n;
Our proof of Lemma 4.2 requires a technical result on the distribution of observed coin flips.
Claim 4.3. Consider any set S of at least
2n log log n log n correct nodes and let X * = max{X u | u ∈ S}, where X u refers to u's variable before node u receives any messages in Phase 1. It holds with probability at least 1 − O(1/ log n) that log 2 n − log 2 (log n) ≤ X * ≤ log 2 n + log 2 log n.
Proof of Claim 4.3.
Observe that X u is geometrically distributed with parameter 1 2 and hence Pr [X u ≥ log 2 n + log 2 log n] ≤ 2 − log 2 n−log 2 log n = 1 n log n .
Taking a union abound over all nodes in S and noting that |S| ≤ n, implies that X * ≤ log 2 n + log 2 log n with probability at least 1 − 1/ log n, proving the upper bound.
For the lower bound, we first bound the probability that the estimate of a single node u ∈ S is above the required threshold. We get
where the second last equality follows from the properties of the geometric distribution. Considering the complementary event, namely that X u is below the threshold, and taking a union bound over the set S, yields
2n log log n/ log n ≤ exp − 2n log n log log n 2n log n , thus completing the proof of Claim 4.3.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We note that the values N are powers of 2 and, since any node not in EST must have a value of X strictly smaller than for any node that is in EST , Part (b) follows. Thus we focus on (a) in the remainder of the proof.
To obtain a lower bound on the size of EST , we define the set S in the premise of Claim 4.3 to consist of the first 2n log log n log n nodes that receive the ack for their broadcast in Phase 1 of the algorithm. LetS be the set of alive nodes that are not in S. Then, all nodes inS are guaranteed to receive the maximum value broadcast by nodes in S before completing Phase 1. Observe that any node u ∈S must have N u ≤ n log n by instantiating Claim 4.3 with setS. Since EST contains at least all nodes inS, the lemma follows.
We now focus on Phase 2 of the algorithm which is conceptually structured into asynchronous rounds, where each round consists of one iteration of the for-loop of Algorithm 4. When talking about some event E in round r that concerns a set of nodes U , we refer to the collection of events in the message schedule where the nodes in U execute the corresponding events. We say that u ∈ EST is the earliest node in round r, if u receives its ack for its round r broadcast before all other nodes in the message schedule. Note that which node is the earliest depends on the scheduler and can change from round to round. and hence the expected number of active nodes is at most log 2 n. Since nodes become active independently, an application of a standard Chernoff bound [37] shows that at most 4 log 2 n nodes in EST become active with high probability.
We now consider Part (b). We know that the number of rounds executed by any node v / ∈ EST choose distinct ranks from the rank of v must be at least 1 − . In that case, a union bound over the active nodes implies that, for the event dist, which occurs when all nodes have unique ranks, we get
Moreover, conditioning on the event that all active nodes choose ranks from [1, L 4 ] does not increase the probability of u choosing the smallest rank, which tells us that
where the last inequality follows from (5). Conditioned on event dist and the premise of the lemma of having at most 4 log 2 n active nodes, the probability of u picking the smallest rank is at least 1/4 log 2 n, i.e., Pr
Plugging the above bound and (4) into the right-hand side of (3) shows that q ≥ 1 20 log 2 n . Conditioned on Lemma 4.2.(a), we know that every node in EST , and in particular, the earliest node u, has probability at least 1 n log n of being active in any single round r ∈ Γ. We have
for any round r ∈ Γ and the respective earliest node u in r.
Recalling that Γ comprises Ω(n log 2 n log log n) rounds, it follows that the event that, for none of the rounds in Γ, the earliest node becomes the smallest ranked active node, happens with probability at most
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Validity follows since any value written to variable val was the input value of some node. For termination, notice the number of rounds executed by any node u depends on the value of T u = O(N u log 3 (N u ) log log(N u )) in Phase 2. From Claim 4.3, we know that N u ≤ n log n for all nodes u with probability 1 − o(1) and hence the maximum number of rounds executed by any node u is O(n log 4 n log log n), which results in the same bound for the total number of broadcasts by u. Taking into account that there are n nodes, the claimed termination bound follows.
Conditioned on the properties of set EST (cf. Lemma 4.2), we now show that almost all nodes decide on a common value. From Lemma 4.5 we know that with probability 1 − o(1), there is a set Γ containing a round r ∈ Γ, in which the earliest node u is active, non-faulty, and has the minimum rank. Let t ′ be the event when u receives the corresponding ack for its round r broadcast message m u carrying val u . By Lemma 4.4.(b), we know that every node v ∈ EST is performing all rounds in Γ and hence will receive u's message m u in some receive event t ′ v that precedes t ′ in the message schedule. Moreover, since u was the earliest node in round r, it follows that event t ′ v must be part of some round r ′ ≤ r (at v) and in particular must occur before v receives its ack for round r. If r ′ < r, then v defers the processing of message m u until v reaches round r; otherwise, if r ′ = r, then v adopts u's value when it receives its ack. By Lemma 4.4.(b), the nodes in EST execute all rounds of Γ and hence all of them will adopt val u when receiving their ack in round r.
To complete the proof, we will argue that no node in EST changes its value after round r. For the sake of a contradiction, suppose that there is some w ∈ EST that adopts some value z = val u during an ack event t ′ w in some round r w > r. Moreover, assume that t w is the earliest such event in the message schedule that is causally influenced by u's round r broadcast event t. Since u has the smallest rank in r, it follows that w must have received a message r ′ , ρ ′ , x , which was sent by some node u ′ during its round r ′ = r. First, observe that if r ′ < r, then also r ′ < r w and hence w would have discarded that message in event t w . Now consider the case r ′ > r. Since only nodes in EST perform broadcasts during the rounds in Γ, it follows that u ′ ∈ EST , and hence by the above argument we know that u ′ must have broadcast some x = val u after having adopted val u in its round r. This means that u ′ updated its value in some event after round r but before t w , contradicting the assumption that t w was the earliest event (after round r) in the message schedule where such an update occurred. It follows that at least |EST | − f = n 1 − O log log n log n − f nodes decide on a common value.
When applying Lemmas 4.2, 4.4, and 4.5 in the argument above, we condition on events each of which happens with probability 1 − o(1). Hence we can remove the conditioning while retaining a probability of success of 1 − o(1).
Lower Bound
We conclude our investigation by showing a separation between the abstract MAC layer model and the related asynchronous message passing model. In more detail, we prove below that fault-tolerant consensus with constant success probability is impossible in a variation of the asynchronous message passing model where nodes are provided only a constant-fraction approximation of the network size and communicate using (blind) broadcast. This bounds holds even if we assume no crashes and provide nodes unique ids from a small set. Notice, in the abstract MAC layer model, we solve consensus with broadcast under the harsher constraints of no network size information, no ids, and crash failures. The difference is the fact that the broadcast primitive in the abstract MAC layer model includes an acknowledgment. This acknowledgment is therefore revealed to be the crucial element of the our model that allows algorithms to overcome lack of network information. We note that this bound is a generalization of the result from [1] , which proved deterministic consensus was impossible under these constraints. In the proof of the theorem, we show that, for any given randomized algorithm we can construct scenarios that are indistinguishable for the nodes, thus causing conflicting decisions. Proof. In our proof we construct admissible executions by restricting ourselves to schedules that are infinite sequences of layers (cf. [41] ). For a given set of nodes S, we define a layer L(S) to consist of an arbitrarily ordered sequence of nodes in S, say u 1 , . . . , u k , followed by a sequence of sets of received messages M 1 , . . . , M k , where M i denotes the set of messages received by node u i . Layer L(S) defines a schedule where each u i takes a compute step (in the given order), in which it can perform some local computation and broadcast a message. We conclude the layer by scheduling each u j ∈ S to take sufficiently many receive steps to ensure that all messages in M j are delivered. We restrict the sets M j such that each message m ∈ M j must have been broadcast in L(S) or some layer preceding L(S) in the schedule.
Assume, towards a contradiction, that there is a randomized consensus algorithm that succeeds with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ. Consider the n-node clique network H 0 of nodes u 1 , . . . , u n where each node is equipped with some arbitrary unique identifier and all nodes start with consensus input 0. Moreover, nodes are given the network size estimate 2n. By a slight abuse of notation, we use H 0 to refer to both, the network and the set of nodes in the network. We specify the schedule σ 0 to be the infinite sequence L(H 0 ), L(H 0 ), . . . where layer L(H 0 ) is such that all broadcasts by nodes in H 0 are received by all nodes in H 0 in the very same layer in which they are sent. Since σ 0 results in an admissible execution according to the asynchronous broadcast model, there exists a fixed integer t 0 such that all nodes in H 0 have decided with probability at least 1 − 1/n within the first t 0 steps of σ 0 . Validity and agreement tell us that, if nodes decide in the t 0 -step prefix σ ′ 0 of σ 0 , their decision must be on 0 with probability at least 1 − ǫ.
Similarly, we define a schedule σ 1 = L(H 1 ), L(H 1 ), . . . on a network H 1 of n nodes where all nodes start with input 1, a network size estimate of 2n, and nodes are given a set of unique IDs disjoint from the IDs used for H 0 . By a similar argument as above, there is an integer t 1 such that the algorithm ensures a common decision on 1 with probability at least 1 − ǫ, conditioned on nodes deciding within t 1 steps (which itself is bound to happen with probability ≥ 1 − 1/n); we denote the corresponding schedule prefix by σ ′ 1 . Now, we consider the clique network G on the set of nodes H 0 ∪ H 1 where nodes in H 0 have input 0, nodes in H 1 start with input 1, and the same set of IDs are assigned as above. Here nodes are given the same network size estimate, i.e., 2n, as in networks H 0 and H 1 , which unbeknownst to them is the actual network size of G. We define an infinite "synchronous" schedule σ 2 consisting of layers such that, in each layer, all nodes in H 0 ∪ H 1 take compute steps in round-robin order and then perform receive steps of all pending messages. We construct an infinite schedule by concatenating the schedules σ ′ 0 σ ′ 1 σ 2 in the natural way; we refer the reader to [36] for the formal definitions of concatenating schedules. It is straightforward to verify that σ ′ 0 σ ′ 1 σ 2 results in an admissible execution for the clique network G according to the asynchronous broadcast model.
To conclude our proof, we use an indistinguishability argument. For a given network H, let r be a vector of |H| bit-strings, representing the respective sequences of random coin flips observed by the nodes in H. We define α(H, r, N, σ) to be the execution where nodes in H observe the coin flips given by r, have knowledge of the network size estimate N , and execute steps according to some schedule σ. Note that α (H, r, N, σ) is an execution prefix if σ is finite. By construction, all messages between H 0 and H 1 are still pending for delivery at the end of schedule σ ′ 0 σ ′ 1 . It follows that, for any vector of random strings r, the execution prefixes α(G, r, 2n, σ ′ 0 ) and α(H 0 , r, 2n, σ ′ 0 ) are indistinguishable for nodes in H 0 , i.e., they perform the same sequence of local state transitions. Similarly, α(G, r, 2n, σ ′ 0 σ ′ 1 ) and α(H 1 , r, σ ′ 1 ) are indistinguishable for nodes in H 1 . Recall that the lengths of the prefixes σ ′ 0 and σ ′ 1 are chosen in a way such that all nodes in H 0 (resp. H 1 ) decide in the (finite) schedule σ ′ 0 (resp. σ ′ 1 ) with probability ≥ 1 − 1/n, and by the above indistinguishability, the same is true by the end of schedule σ ′ 0 σ ′ 1 . Conditioned on the event E that this is happens, we have argued above that all nodes in H 0 decide on 0 with probability at least 1 − ǫ when executing the schedule σ ′ 0 σ ′ 1 σ 2 in the network G. Given the same schedule, nodes in H 1 decide on 1 with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ and hence agreement is violated with probability at least (1 − ǫ) 2 . Let F be the event that the algorithm fails. Since we have assumed that the algorithm fails with probability at most ǫ, we get
Solving the inequality yields ǫ ≥ 2 − √ 3 as required.
